Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9cd68080edd51fe0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

25.2 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 Authoring application: String.fromCharCode
MD5: 4bef97c6d4dbb0a86a1b312ee8a97399 SHA-1: c56b5b51a7b5b72905dff3279ac1c6dd54477f16 SHA-256: 9cd68080edd51fe022db73b210dc2442b109cfdcd592d1748c9cf81709df5486
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/TypeScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, identified by the 'PDF_JAVASCRIPT' and 'PDF_JS' heuristics. The 'PDF_METADATA_EVAL_STAGER' heuristic indicates that this JavaScript is used to decode and execute a payload, likely leveraging 'String.fromCharCode' as seen in the document body and embedded scripts. The exact nature of the payload is not fully discernible from the provided evidence, but the technique suggests a downloader or initial execution stage.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF metadata JavaScript eval stager high PDF_METADATA_EVAL_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript reads document metadata fields such as title, subject, or producer, decodes character data with parseInt/String.fromCharCode style helpers, and evals the recovered stage. This is a high-signal exploit-kit staging pattern.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
c7416ce2cf8169e7065254fe805df025dbe2717185b0ff34cc15a7783e9ff1d5
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6232 401 bytes