Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9cc556bc7d6ef274…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

126.2 KB Created: 2020-01-31 06:29:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: ee863740832a35ddc66aa2eb60f24ec7 SHA-1: 33e34d445dc3ed8ccc1b038e151bd586d623158c SHA-256: 9cc556bc7d6ef2748c62d77892e9e57e318b709f06c6f1a83bf0a1233a4e6b79
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7571647-0', indicating it functions as a downloader. The presence of a Document_Open macro and GetObject calls strongly suggests that the VBA code within the document is executed upon opening. This macro is likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload, a common characteristic of Emotet. The extracted artifact also matches the Emotet signature.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7571647-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7571647-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f67726d5b3b225a820935b106a63e59059108a5c730832411299a378e6c65d9d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6735 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
3b286af231d417543716dcc26a052923ef14a2bb16ebe89772226110ee78bd8f		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 50688 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7571647-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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