Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c7c43b7500d9a49…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

52.8 KB
MD5: c41490f279dab3418821f442a0e450c7 SHA-1: b7de5731ec0af5cf85d493891ee0ad3a3a2cff93 SHA-256: 9c7c43b7500d9a49591cbafb3e9ff4312cb291d1b3cffc5c975a6ce0e8f9b46d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. This indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded OLE object is activated automatically, leading to code execution. The likely intent is to leverage this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload, although no specific download URL or script was directly extracted from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000006bf.bin
b0e056a0590da5e210a936c653777cdb09bf83e04e89683d8f50148356a3c0c6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x6BF 1900 bytes