Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c770b0c625f2e5d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.6 KB Created: 2021-03-22 04:59:58 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d6c422a5bc9b16438f97009f5c78eab2 SHA-1: 7965b4b7f465bf939273c57c5e71a05724fa9c0a SHA-256: 9c770b0c625f2e5d2f76d6804fcbd78a58432ee01e9314b113ee7f5f3e5befa5
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one specifically to a redirector with a 'brightness driver' lure. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to execute a command or click a link, consistent with social engineering attacks. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to lead the user to a phishing site or download further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=brightness+driver+for+windows+10++hp
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4424982/normal_601c8706017d7.pdf
    • https://fazodokivev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018208/6887cc787.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4386086/normal_60088e0a93dcb.pdf
    • https://fakanodadix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371587/9f76f8.pdf
    • http://fito4ka.xyz/munaranekeviwixojusaragukyj3k.pdf
    • https://wujupeduluruwuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135316277/8378975.pdf
    • https://kevonixoxudunu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775897/togotoxetug.pdf
    • http://my-favshop.online/vekolavijadiravirokizujugpoenu.pdf
    • http://store50off.info/13551731775d56rr.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379969/normal_6036b1990a797.pdf
    • https://zotadapavera.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134483721/2b9da8.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425238/normal_601abefa14403.pdf
    • https://poxapoxidofex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016688/1cb236217c58a7.pdf
    • http://theharaka.online/momavetovuui970.pdf
    • https://roparinupiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135392621/3248871.pdf
    • https://vetedikagumon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453784/429f01d1dfd7741.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://e97408dc-4b05-4e3b-9f19-f4127feb49ef.filesusr.com/ugd/a42eed_d51247c3147c456fa53dc2f777e4545f.pdf?index=true
    • https://2c9641c8-5874-4869-9b94-f1378e60aa6b.filesusr.com/ugd/efc1f6_48fba0468e2e49b58e3648dfb45ed036.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rerinago/kevovezokeloligu.pdf
    • https://ff9dba89-6132-4485-99c2-ace8a2453124.filesusr.com/ugd/c3f59f_3648f1955b0b4c2d95c0f7d8c48d066b.pdf?index=true
    • https://4e33067b-0f13-4bed-bb9c-ea95f768fd7c.filesusr.com/ugd/23924c_f08b6cf976c44909b033339f70d36c8b.pdf?index=true
    • https://0ea28b16-58c2-472d-b6be-3e97fe9b7bb6.filesusr.com/ugd/696b8a_5a5a67d444284116b3047c15f5c78d12.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rogugagatuf/74599424035.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/risisipajole/despacito_lyrics_ringtone.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zabejuvijolu/vaxufizoto.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fe38.bin
a59c4fbc020c437445e36e19c57f52d825b9840b0be15635e5f4987aafcab1f4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE38 5244 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001102a.bin
6735d8e2af8af1fbc98747b86d54b731b0f57d8fe14e3377a3f48b7a19ca919b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1102A 11188 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013671.bin
1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13671 4324 bytes