RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9c6e844702042048

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.35 MB First seen: 2019-03-18

MD5: e251e6ce778790a26257f42ad36b6a89 SHA-1: 2f7636e858233738c440c6b99d8de2c5c9081390 SHA-256: 9c6e844702042048f3e6edee273ef03e732dbc44831a1e01de8895eb5929c586

482 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-8570, including Composite Moniker and Equation Editor CLSID firings. The embedded OLE object data, particularly objdata_06_off0002d62f.bin, likely contains the second-stage payload, as indicated by the presence of a PE header in hex data and ClamAV detections on extracted artifacts. The exploit facilitates client execution by leveraging the vulnerability to drop and run a malicious binary.

Heuristics 11

Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570

RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
ClamAV: Win.Malware.Dfcy-6695092-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Malware.Dfcy-6695092-0
PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX

Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1230KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000031.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x31	615116 bytes
SHA-256: `960504a5016f87b91f0de648dc0e44da76b1d3cf6caa5afb3e4e6a1c8273a03e`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Malware.Dfcy-6695092-0 Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryExA, VirtualAlloc, GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, CreateThread
`objdata_01_off00144c2f.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x144C2F	32399 bytes
SHA-256: `80a8cff4c375acafce1dbd4cfe7660558c078465352c9a622f13460c7621a5e2`
`objdata_02_off00154985.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x154985	381 bytes
SHA-256: `3458e1d85410d8b0a08c68591e0912e582782375d61f43343a9a5d6983b8c436`
`objdata_03_off00154cbb.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x154CBB	788 bytes
SHA-256: `9f474d871d5073e0821f436fc51680b1a4730c0843652540921f90acc5b5f4a5`
`objdata_04_off00155361.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x155361	2247 bytes
SHA-256: `992c836552ac8953ea96f98fe3fdf2f015904931030078610b1ec4c608451d62`
`objdata_05_off00156585.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x156585	4679 bytes
SHA-256: `a031167f29c59aa6f60f009231ba4b3342834ba008154b405252e98bc2ed362a`

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