Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c37fe8fa22a2b02…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

251.8 KB Created: 2020-12-17 14:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 39f3cabf62bf1557dab5ecb206c0a9b4 SHA-1: bd62d4966139bdb7355ce88339c7a08d2c4b90d5 SHA-256: 9c37fe8fa22a2b027c1c503aa2f033124d62477cfc25ae04fec57318eb4e20bc
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. This object, identified as a risky file type (JAR extension), suggests an attempt to disguise or deliver a malicious payload. The presence of this embedded artifact is the primary indicator of malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not available for analysis.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ceced9bb8960271dc28bdbd7ae28dc8e9115298a8f60ea1eac7af8b12f6b2367		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 244224 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
ddb9e375c3278e6a605c83ec56a360ccbcc9c18211165e8ac45c836ec5d662ed		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 239915 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
5d9d3b04a9fb1b0e74fc0e6bc3b81cfcfbe78683ea8ec4a3d3e0db7ab5b827bb		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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