Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c2c7d7e1c98494d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.8 KB Created: 2020-11-03 21:59:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 23f98318d3b5d9008933dceeff60d222 SHA-1: 31446061e7a8df8c59e8a8a1d6a9b2f6df7fa42e SHA-256: 9c2c7d7e1c98494dc19cd50f7f5a3bdc7038a013d4dda6dd9b4d8ef76ca31f23
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting services and are likely part of a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting the document is designed to lead users to malicious sites. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=kroger+minute+clinic+jefferson+ga In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366055/normal_5f877f601e8ec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://finazodaxuvoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682535/3417736.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/goxarujemexogu_mosegozivi_fofuwad_kezobal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuparududewon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856041/mefavulopuxajezul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425760/normal_5f977d2cd13eb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mekuxiwefajup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739023/1718853.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415300/normal_5fa0fce54cff5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://raxiruzaxulam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738564/4063321.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rudofodirofebas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739781/3228609.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefamojugibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164519/manilumaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://worobewunit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406731/793344bb670d2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xoxajunun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134351876/0297d43fe8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://polivepuba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134582029/780ad5ac51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/kowomepejugovajuwikuzuwan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lejivugeleguwod/john_mackey_composer_facts.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005479.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5479 5244 bytes
SHA-256: 70da0409d47c369b928f74a4661a5a68d03f4b361d8b5108b469f6ab753b91e3
font_01_sfnt_off0000664c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x664C 10504 bytes
SHA-256: 545b04df433e5523dce80726a09f3bf8a27ff1e37a2ea7c822fd594beaa62bc7