Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c1b5ce4e62c8e9f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

106.9 KB Created: 2020-12-25 10:09:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: 8aae51c44edaf07d8403250b365cad6c SHA-1: d6aa6534f7d670c833b7390dd124a691ca456d14 SHA-256: 9c1b5ce4e62c8e9feebc153a2755807296b878b706d3663e91bcb7605d1e5a22
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large link farm with 28 external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a phishing or redirection attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to lead users to malicious content or malware downloads. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm are indicative of a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/strik?utm_term=nascar+speed+limit PDF link annotation
    • https://vexakoloninabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134851928/4f15da201823939.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jirunemopisitex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134332051/runekomexemuwusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4474979/normal_5fd11c0400ad2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruvararet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398095/5511523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tovegema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134505564/najedulimuz-sajiv-jobunaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tijesefufejeje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134858706/vavesenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sizukejagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681884/vosakavezupufozufid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vozumovoso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506012/6065e86.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377697/normal_5f8fb59b9ab51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4450355/normal_5fbdd645d514e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rebazizezasij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134586802/3d61e434770ccd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rubajamepufukav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134432722/4faa168.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lomogas/niwokutijukutejemamigizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarusegibitumet/android_studio_installation_kali_linux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000166cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x166CC 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 5a1a18b751cbd424e0392062725a29851badb7f69c9f6013708373196fad1630
font_01_sfnt_off0001785f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1785F 11292 bytes
SHA-256: c5b0c88091f02f741a95b601cb8aee7848f039567f8c4b856aff6e316691dfc1

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