Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c116bfe5f7dfafe…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.2 KB Created: 2020-07-08 22:40:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 0800c871781ce004217fd86924a94cd7 SHA-1: 728f9e620a3027bbf1054c12b6117a8896cc9db0 SHA-256: 9c116bfe5f7dfafe45f4e013d5b0cbd47c277ff9366dfa658efd3ab6f20859d0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to domains designed to host SEO-optimized PDF files. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains keywords and URLs that reinforce the link farm and redirector findings. The primary attack pattern is to lure users to malicious websites via these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=weidmuller%20terminals%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.chodaepjm.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739895/zizebegofilosalub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.orangevalleycreations.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383510/bujofaketuwomidabej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mfwchicago.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131397934/59716.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.actionpestnm.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398177/wimomudor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vexsens.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775846/waforumuwanaxogudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.panisangelicuspress.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384018/7094245.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.academiescollaborative.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383889/7a1084b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.barbadoscanadafoundation.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453045/suwipabijeruke_dozonavof_javewot_keditipozigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.r2merchandising.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071035/ralupot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://ruxurogizipo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/50600728146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lasewodaba.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gupusobijifumejubojilev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sopemivelazu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/36417591091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wedikul.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lilulozas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/20659662050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/89120948070.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/75555741983.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004dfb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4DFB 4972 bytes
SHA-256: 26862b538a8dd06a28ed487b1f21a581cfc635b53ef84fde754444faf95a3352
font_01_sfnt_off00005ec5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5EC5 12768 bytes
SHA-256: 129d1e9d33c6e2be072c6e8fe34df7b1a683db0fe7302491ec675bcd6c329662

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