Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9bfc70f4104ada50…

MALICIOUS

PDF

149.7 KB Created: 2021-05-10 04:18:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: bef0a6ca2bcfb54c168ac17c60439d22 SHA-1: 103debef99fde983ffdd9c7e163b082584f79c8c SHA-256: 9bfc70f4104ada509f251272e63ff67b17a5e9538c42cdd6faafecf6f616cd27
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including a lure to enable content and a password-protected archive handoff, suggesting it is designed to facilitate the download of a second-stage payload. The presence of numerous links to compromised CMS upload storage and the ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly support a phishing and malware delivery role. The document also contains callback phishing lures, indicating a multi-faceted social engineering approach.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075b8f03909f---94434902671.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://drinkandshrink.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609252d41ea01---20309677242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arrayamed.com/userfiles/file/26625043704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.nrlandscapes.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/87b4e6b609bd65e8b08363a3636509d8/bezifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://precisionautoandac.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c016a67ae79228a5f9b1d2fb28e06ea8/57348484534.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhuishangbiao.com/upload_fck/file/2021-5-10/20210510080339446430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fashioncenterpoint.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f67e271ef9d1fed1b716b8dc50d9984e/zokajebevexaxuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bestmiamiturf.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/926f9dd4c7569542d601807648a62cd8/bofefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://afd.me.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9cnfnmtm3bt1g5tv1giqfbi3k6/tipurazuxozexalusepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cwlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4d8e75133b722a10c945bbfbeae64fdc/fodewosete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asesorialuishervas.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160871652c5871---ludesaletixaban.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gametimecatering.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096fd42bbd70---dekanokibulawoxetefogew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://minutesnap.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d16fe94f18c67252f10923a62d493b79/tijokimogej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.penyembuhanholistikreiki.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160744f11666fe---98349955388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jnfarley.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jci67kmng2sor3h2qqd5ascf51/wutuworavijokinu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albatrossmrn.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/vafisujibepinuwidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=office+365++free+for+pcPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00021022.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21022 5056 bytes
SHA-256: c43110fe09bfc2954b5006ee1a469797cedaf2b6a325616fedfd168cbbaffc04
font_01_sfnt_off0002216d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2216D 11628 bytes
SHA-256: 501babab408a3f7c0db0074954f6bf9b5fd966cd5082855bf7ed87671455ebcd

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