Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9bf22a59c8abbca3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.3 KB Created: 2021-06-07 06:48:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 7414d1988c788be4ae5149681db77162 SHA-1: 9722e066138055bbf6ac65e0a72879887b0cd6c6 SHA-256: 9bf22a59c8abbca3e27b7a4c07c7d031d2903ddce07d2f41a46498505198d228
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It employs social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, by instructing the user to copy and paste content into a command-line interface. This is a common method to bypass macro restrictions and trick users into executing a second-stage payload, likely downloaded from one of the embedded URLs. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to file explorer passwords, suggesting a phishing or credential harvesting pretext.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+see+saved+wifi+password+in+es+file+explorer PDF link annotation
    • https://www.quatainvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b7787716edf---domona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://synodradomski.pl/userfiles/file/surofovilifezikeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://neavocats.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/98a239e87466cd34e558cd6c1cce51d5/xagif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://studio-september.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1cc744d66647adc63fbd2de9178c62f4/90413293460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agrachoff.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ce8787fc8a2d7e05ac28b359627fb5be/76270942434.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://drahmetbostanci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac6caf0ed84---puxegozapiduduwazerisifim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hypnotiseur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b2553afd26---jugiluril.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zge-led.com/luodan/images/userfiles/file/fopoxijomuzukajubabonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://taiwanglassgroup.cn/userfiles/file/11972800572.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.aluvascientific.com/UserFiles/file/pawefebazepazuzog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saftanton.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160703fde82589---fefawexajasadelaji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cardion.dk/gfx/fckimages/file/41204105912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gf-location.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609dc9becb029---1975287496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hssipm.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/241564228f57ccd1e8d81062e5bd31e6/45461737599.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://harasim.cz/uploaded/files/fuvixute.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atl-50.com/files/file/gozewibamafuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aashianarealty.com/file/33031157352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bocamvigliesrooms.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6b18bfacb3c1c1b76935aa512f2fb234/likowajulilerilafesasona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ded3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDED3 5216 bytes
SHA-256: 9117e22d024582d7f1c6c28455cb4b3adfd0de65900c65598161b79faf15977c
font_01_sfnt_off0000f0b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0B7 11472 bytes
SHA-256: ca160cf8a73ecac7dfef8dcea02e0f492e8ed44c32b17e7979f3ada783acade2

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