Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9bdb09b56168bd0a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.0 KB Created: 2020-10-01 23:03:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-19
MD5: 19d7651641a72632f79d87a19758ff0d SHA-1: 762a3caacb8bfe25997fce61c57cba8b68e60e89 SHA-256: 9bdb09b56168bd0a8cc1399d5ced7ed905dcc5cdc202d514f371416a9cdc1ac6
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=book+of+lairs+5e In PDF document text
    • http://repuwevuf.equityrt64.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454165/8570612.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.drdeirdra-faithcounselingllc.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381428/1774647.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kikiz.tresbienensemble.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775692/fobivomonutopug_tapelof_nepuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gunowumev.andyknappmusic.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874493/gosuvarazaluxugaros.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cedarhillsoaps.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871426/8776575.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.elizabethsaitta.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776381/7480392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.earlychildhoodeducationassembly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437513/suzewopisudo-fufomojulufa-tanapumoxuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/87e3166d-edee-4c06-a8eb-e29edb726aee/22399481238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0ac51ed4-b845-4aa0-b532-c6d76db9edfb/zugumujalitotudosurinob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dc32093e-291c-4ca6-8b89-a2f11349607a/97121134157.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/129b41ce-dd97-4645-989d-dfef12bcdf39/bitozabawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b4ce8097-65ac-4df9-b8aa-42f42afeda2f/41555615442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000052dc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x52DC 4996 bytes
SHA-256: 44219becd355005524b1524908b961e812681f3bb274b4e59889251177bd9f31
font_01_sfnt_off000063f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63F2 10460 bytes
SHA-256: cdfafeaa38506c9fbe9a4cb5c3033d59cbbbb7c3e2e4de75bd01174e1cb6b6f7