Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9bc67196980153d6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

770.0 KB
MD5: fcad3d5303179507538b8177d77ae6a3 SHA-1: 92c5a5ba5420d951544f58519d355d47f3943569 SHA-256: 9bc67196980153d6cdfc6d2ab0ac723092488a96c08e2905944c998a0f42cf61
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a password-protected Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability allows it to act as a remote loader, downloading and executing a secondary payload from the URL http://internationalantivirussmartscreensecur.duckdns.org/windows/invoice.doc. The document's encrypted nature and the exploit carrier shape indicate it is designed to conceal malicious content and deliver further stages.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://internationalantivirussmartscreensecur.duckdns.org/windows/invoice.doc

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