Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9baeb06c469c8a58…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.20 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 4528c0cc8dee15bb13d1ba698ff5fbbe SHA-1: c7efafdb55fec29a1475b01f9627c6b075f77569 SHA-256: 9baeb06c469c8a58781557c46e8e045f74f748e6d33a4f1617ad4ce37471135e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the critical heuristics point to a known exploit vector.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00219173.bin
6cf2cacd65b9df0b5777f4548a5f3bcf301cca8f9913867b4f78d6215fdea86a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x219173 3732 bytes