RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9ba2df825e8cb3f0

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.7 KB First seen: 2024-07-21

MD5: ce272fefd1022e4f1567768f1e73f68b SHA-1: 0a34debdac7b96767f6f7c1740c8a3f3309c367c SHA-256: 9ba2df825e8cb3f091952f001d6b18fe2c4c51a2164e44b3c12ee57057175d3c

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious Code

The RTF document contains critical heuristic firings indicating the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and OLE object manipulation (RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE). These techniques are commonly used to exploit software flaws and execute embedded malicious code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data further supports the exploitation vector.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000110b.bin` `9c35fa4d374f877e037dc0182d9d6758262fc7ba816124635da94e1fc863c152`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x110B	1769 bytes

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