Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ba1caf33422865e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

96.8 KB Created: 2021-08-26 04:23:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 2836c0322898106ae81186283e9fec5c SHA-1: 2ea266ca6ed5a84381779e9221b7af6ce2c611a6 SHA-256: 9ba1caf33422865ecc11f3c5402d64a9702d7e0808e32a0c26eed2ad25f79adc
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating it is a link farm hosted on compromised CMS uploads and disposable domains, designed to lure users into downloading further malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9916

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://clinicaveterinariagussago.com/userfiles/files/viluzubemakakoxotejedofo.pdf
    • https://quangcaobienbang.vn/upload/fck/file/92340546335.pdf
    • http://architects-desk.com/uploadsfile/1063767179.pdf
    • http://timatey.kz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f0u6n32a67ckrccnmec6khp562/268235811.pdf
    • http://artside.org/data/temp/file/32740742503.pdf
    • http://www.itbaloch.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609fdaa4a09a9---86078599021.pdf
    • https://endoaccessories.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pg30quanklkrq38l1t864v3gjo/85684421628.pdf
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c6c80083780---12509086884.pdf
    • http://www.saraviation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e1ed47d5e9---84557517263.pdf
    • https://yarsan.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/49ee2ef8dbeef68fda6f42053e524bef/jenutal.pdf
    • http://schodylux.pl/userfiles/file/16990577757.pdf
    • https://xn--1--8kcai1ck2bs.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/76ff0a49a5773a16ab7a504a37bd2ec1/31732052077.pdf
    • https://lecachet.fr/docs/files/neseged.pdf
    • http://www.champcaregivers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1611634fee2f90---11177401178.pdf
    • http://31kouqiang.com/userfiles/file/1624467442.pdf
    • http://timatey.kz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2a4fph9ah42t9pcjmc3hk5ig80/93086013825.pdf
    • http://www.alexgis.com/siteuploads/editorimg/file/zigivumokumamuvefu.pdf
    • http://banquat.com/userfiles/files/sasofoka.pdf
    • https://inchirierielicopter.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b86a9e5a4fa---metilito.pdf
    • http://mayjack.com/upload/files/54041296846.pdf
    • http://afghansolar.com/userfiles/file/61716482257.pdf
    • http://a-range.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160acd0e4ad84a---pavonososarubazomewikijal.pdf
    • https://clifestyle.net/uploades/userfiles/file/konepolatex.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=humss+subjects+grade+11+module
    • http://kioskcondoweb.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc31788855---92518841576.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010b16.bin
ea0c648c804d6379b5a78d6578c9f89edd248a7a3a81947afb9ebfa3c4dc05df		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10B16 10932 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012451.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12451 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013c63.bin
98886c3caec542312bff5bb2149ecd442cf930e8af53d7e25c1702a5147f6417		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13C63 17528 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00016a84.bin
1257dc2bda7a49adc775415e9aa32f8e8c1b61e7673a6d345e3d0f5e1690a4ce		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16A84 2000 bytes

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