Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ba0b41e640de4a8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.8 KB Created: 2021-07-02 17:52:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: c10e856616a4e90932441ba47361938d SHA-1: 3d95a35737f74e73c180fdacec93645897b748ee SHA-256: 9ba0b41e640de4a84c0c9323fff647ac4690fba72ce050877464611c957d47ff
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple links to external PDF files hosted on various domains, some of which are identified as compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting. The 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' heuristic indicates the document's content likely prompts the user to install a browser extension or update, a common social engineering tactic. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to deliver a second-stage payload or phish for credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://thebellingerfamily.com/clients/0/05/05034faaa501c69409a7459485cba135/File/53168673689.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://tanabuauto.com/js/upload/files/buwojevap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anandamsanyal.com/userfiles/file/gedaberitizebadoxodufimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://accessiblevehicleservices.com/userfiles/file/dozefebaraletixefudunuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alsterparkett.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r571drqnj8h0o4lhg7d6ae50vu/ralapiwurusoxez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://architettoletiziamasciotta.eu/userfiles/files/xakuriruba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alshaabcoop.com/userfiles/file/80531308324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agribusiness.pk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b477c78d584---17298645398.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.siscard.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084091d9fb13---27423833602.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davidcosz.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4jctbeichkvkqf6bvn3l8rc32u/ferakuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://parquesanalbertohurtado.cl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wufavasovivulol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://philippinesroadshow.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/10c792d73b3c06f7d94b36a495799766/mitikawinewovipigas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://elmaga.lt/components/com_mijoshop/opencart/image/data/files/girunenutoxoxisigafogadu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://apexforestservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080ca2f235e6---tapetuxefubadezakeregad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spc1991.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/geguxokefamok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://angarakshaksecurity.com/userfiles/file/ganeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vandervalk.reviews/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/33426005757.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.oschouston.com/osc/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bf4ae00edc---36239143917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sushikyototogo.com/uploads/files/99240629815.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daming-school.com/userfiles/file/radaluxudoverufas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anonelectronics.com/admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/upload_jpg/file/202105030728259511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kulturazebrak.cz/userfiles/81264778325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+hack+pubg+lite+without+banPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010152.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10152 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00011964.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11964 17576 bytes
SHA-256: c80da6efc9c52a6eab43681b26b3ae9a97105e34075fda9d705c4a8e908c5160
font_02_sfnt_off000147ae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x147AE 10796 bytes
SHA-256: dced736a1e8b8c31b24436637d37685b359c5ecaba0f183afd40ad613f280525