Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9b0ff58ddedd7a78…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

115.8 KB Created: 2020-07-23 08:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2023-01-24
MD5: d01979536eade500990dea8f6259e45b SHA-1: e7c65ab2a327141e8906e3d77ce776e52dce70a8 SHA-256: 9b0ff58ddedd7a78e3b8f28c9c5a4934ea9f4dc530d57cc7715bdca6687590fc
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a DOCM file containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine. This macro utilizes URLDownloadToFile to download a file named 'Ub.pdf' and then executes it using WshShell.run. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and the URLDownloadToFile function strongly indicate a downloader pattern.

Heuristics 6

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.GreenBox5-9139204-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.GreenBox5-9139204-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
91aa22a98794174f75577dee2e54f6dec3b7161bca2db41603cac5298a96411b
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4063 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
6f03ee0f46c5bd0ff42d18ffd38eb55766721fd50271da300a9e982f7141492d
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes