Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9b0d69fb55f19daf…

MALICIOUS

RTF

22.0 KB
MD5: f91d63818f23d931c6f097bd68522a1f SHA-1: f756c25287fbc1580333dbbe2d6b053f5a7111be SHA-256: 9b0d69fb55f19daf06d650794856cf77715d55eabf646b191eef2b033fe12549
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains multiple high-severity heuristics indicating the exploitation of OLE object activation. Specifically, RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE suggest that embedded OLE objects are being automatically activated. The presence of RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM further confirms that a native OLE object is embedded, which is likely the mechanism for delivering a malicious payload. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual clues, but the heuristics strongly point to an attack pattern involving the execution of embedded content.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000be1.bin
4dbc5afba9ed9cb9d7fb575b1fe8d1a8341e1d2804cfc1e6d5ad82fba38ef1b4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBE1 4166 bytes