Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9af8a32eb9296254…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

187.0 KB Created: 2020-12-26 12:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: eae1f20bff936687e6c511efe3c38ba9 SHA-1: 5f861e591b6d9e68cc94f48b35186042b877f423 SHA-256: 9af8a32eb92962546dfa3c6b52b578ad0ab6330728ac1bab989a7e9e452e78ee
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The file is an Office document containing an embedded OLE object. This object, identified as a packaged executable (jar file), is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The embedded artifact suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary payload, likely an executable, upon opening or interaction.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
2232ef0174b58de1f8cfb8f7bfcbd2790d7daa5d8bd8e679819a0dbb803d4bc4		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 176128 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
0e06bbfe6b7513cd9e15e83abcc46ddf39f3b8ece2e07fe03ab7192cae36f497		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 172409 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
92f69ec3b46d92640ce2774bfe328fdd4de90bd2555e704c23a5fe20e4bcc5c8		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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