RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9af05c1cb783bb50

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.7 KB

MD5: 8bf656a930d62170864950522b5cd0c0 SHA-1: 84f35f08fb77e75a32314c6778a9da5afa8379ce SHA-256: 9af05c1cb783bb50a2f280fd22bdc4a8b5160488afc7093a383e6e60cac4d90e

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. The RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics suggest that an OLE object is embedded and activated, likely to trigger the exploit. The primary attack vector is spearphishing, with the embedded exploit leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000c80.bin` `912c90a54131e9bcb3f7172e7fc0c5269577b0679dfafad9234ae17ce2acb853`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xC80	1698 bytes

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