Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ad6427937610c1d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

664.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-15
MD5: c370870f2517c33c1f107c12242106fd SHA-1: 3d2c8dde4c8f37ef24df51ca6bb9aaa950a02cc8 SHA-256: 9ad6427937610c1d427e183082bdbf26a3f5f78644230a2552dba4c9c69160d2
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://025475315536/cucucucucucucucuucuc.php. Although the VBA project itself contains no executable statements, the presence of the OLE2Link object and the associated URL strongly suggest that this document is designed to act as a loader for a secondary malicious payload. The embedded PDF stream is also suspicious.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://025475315536/cucucucucucucucuucuc.php
    • https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off00016841.bin
f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes

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