Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9abb7acef8fbf98f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

8.2 KB
MD5: b7d29507b09fb9f29fdb930d9bd2cbd8 SHA-1: cdec80d1af083e92b15acdd9a5fe835bb14fbe09 SHA-256: 9abb7acef8fbf98fb49e13bc382c918cb3714404544c235f0f61c60dac0e99c2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability. This exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a second-stage payload, although no specific URLs or script content were directly extractable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000e5f.bin
3acaaabb9465af1687f874cd1a11a7a1937e3c82c11119b423c2a79c9b526e1c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE5F 1649 bytes