Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9aac2023bad1d13e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

103.0 KB Created: 2018-06-24 20:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: cb012dac0ffcd07656bdd1f1cdf19ddb SHA-1: c7361e972fb7447824198b209cae2885916be54c SHA-256: 9aac2023bad1d13ea236b00528b644b0429c83f1874acf2a24a3e73f0baad7ac
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file contains a legacy WordBasic AutoOpen macro that is configured to execute a shell command. This is strongly indicative of a dropper functionality, where the macro is used to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of a large slack space in the OLE structure further suggests the file may be packed or obfuscated. ClamAV detection as 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6595525-0' supports this assessment.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6595525-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6595525-0
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 105,472 bytes but its declared streams total only 62,420 bytes — 43,052 bytes (41%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 322 bytes
SHA-256: f1c313c9a092c8118b9f137e573b4c854f3a7f1ccc3c3fd533317797bae94ebf
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "QdITzZNNNA"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "rZtivMUjWOuUm"