Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a90f0e980bbc55f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

30.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-03
MD5: 73c5fe3a808bf91874c1f634f60ab472 SHA-1: 4a55c08aabf4c3632df63eadc675020f2046593e SHA-256: 9a90f0e980bbc55ff70eb8e328eaffdfd2050b8967f1af02b7fecd4421318112
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and OLE object activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-enabled malicious documents. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000493d.bin
af718040019ad5cf62ff0bca49934204afa823d9c823d8e870aaeac73be41180		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x493D 1308 bytes

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