RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9a86f5ec47aaa7ae

MALICIOUS

RTF

77.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-23

MD5: a819430cdd5da2c289f594ceac0f0035 SHA-1: 4065da2e12db9c926a184801dd5e5de7444b3027 SHA-256: 9a86f5ec47aaa7ae34e71528ca34e75fc806064aa3dc664bbee2db7b35b7b6b2

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to execute arbitrary code. The presence of \objdata, \objupdate, and RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, leading to a high confidence in a malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000b9b.bin` `cf71ea6998272714f7e0b08910f837afecba2537b7c5b9bd212a04b63200b20b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xB9B	1706 bytes

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