Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a832ef10e9d7b24…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.44 MB
MD5: ecf28c6784cee57077a6fd73eca118ec SHA-1: 35686a7576620e6535a27fd50503fa36ce4e0d50 SHA-256: 9a832ef10e9d7b2409baee1969535df5924083cb78fd6f46707869ede2f0a4c7
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. This strongly suggests it's an exploit carrier designed to leverage vulnerabilities within the Equation Editor component. The presence of an embedded OLE object within an encrypted OOXML file is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting such vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.