Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a66b234f72141c0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

156.7 KB Created: 2006-08-16 17:20:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: f53a8fa782110402800a3173aa1e5cbd SHA-1: 9d3da6a86c0b836124b78b7b55d3f8ed0edaa309 SHA-256: 9a66b234f72141c0557b948bd86e6eea400e27084d2a3a200872a1196b06c0a6
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample exhibits characteristics of malicious code, including a NOP sled and XOR-encoded strings, suggesting an attempt to hide or execute malicious functionality. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also anomalous. Without a document body or script content, the exact attack vector and payload delivery mechanism remain unclear, leading to a lower confidence in family attribution.

Heuristics 3

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x81) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x81: 'kernel32.dll', 'advapi32.dll', 'shell32.dll', 'msvcrt.dll', 'msvcrt.dll', 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'ExitProcess'
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 160,501 bytes but its declared streams total only 17,055 bytes — 143,446 bytes (89%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.