Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a5ae590fdef94a8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.7 KB Created: 2021-09-03 16:44:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: c90278db69f6710dc61edbf5bf93c573 SHA-1: 72ef96ff67442a66b4b1f3acb6f6d6232771486d SHA-256: 9a5ae590fdef94a865ed3a448598aec963a7127e9fad5d308cd881b1725ce0b7
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript payload that references URLs likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic firings indicate the presence of a malicious script and a link farm pointing to compromised CMS uploads, suggesting a phishing or credential harvesting attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.finestkindcharter.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c833191437---xuzukenug.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://pensionatiitalianiinportogallo.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e01884176952c1dfb9d51de090e2a75f/83268370407.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://frennphotography.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161291de80dece---newimaxebotafuwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ipsgroupjjn.org/userfiles/file/totemul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nutstudio.it/userfiles/file/71560428061.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://przedszkolenisko.pl/userfiles/file/76580761721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sevgiliyevideo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a39e3172df3---xesigomurosigaligowikarof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://outsourcedbackoffice.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/64f9a3e344adc616d22136bf68b35b33/17362738230.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hengtaixin.com/HangShun/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gulixedizin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.elsecretodelolivo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bcecbe4b3db---basepufijamuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cedicar.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d90e624ace---zufefutov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dachastyle.com/userfiles/file/51790767965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pianoszimmermann.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609048a283500---wixekizegikozumimomopama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuepancong.com/contents//files/livovos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ricoconsultingattorney.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/rulexajatufegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lumieretvie.com/userfiles/file/13039677127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shimamura-mail-order.com/userfiles/file/83476632025.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spectrumohio.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/85fdbee78712e8060bc9d4e152deff72/lewelez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hr-serdahel.hu/images/file/67301946036.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://banghetretruc.com/media/ftp/file/30180409554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ceraunavoltapizzeria.it/userfiles/files/15994139097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://africanhairbraidingsalon.com/userfiles/file/lodopefaruwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pkynfe.net/userfiles/file/wawigizumepegiziva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hamyarsanatco.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/59508566573.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.reparaciondebomba.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jk8oceftor6d6grohbf2sbg5p4/63927066762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+base64+decode+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001297e.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1297E 1633 bytes
SHA-256: 62b1b1518f945375eceb59b55e9527e4c955356f0fb563bab6e9d81b5d75c395
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Serif PagePlus'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Yobodidi Ralere</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell base64 decode pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell base64 decode image. Powershell base64 decode online. Powershell base64 d</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell base64 decode pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell base64 decode image. Powershell base64 decode online. Powershell base64 d</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell base64 decode pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Serif PagePlus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-06T02:35:00'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Serif PagePlus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='da589d91-c6ee-4726-84ae-c85f37917fa5'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='64a06cb4-3cf3-4b57-9194-415b03bf225c'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000c099.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC099 17884 bytes
SHA-256: 88db9f260a127fd91d9e292b1887bd56ce56c14aaef16d99c6b1c281b91e09f5
font_01_sfnt_off0000efb3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFB3 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000107ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x107CA 10896 bytes
SHA-256: 0f7095afe2855bc61a91dd3e0e7d2ef6590e10475a4fbaa0b88631ac5d9eef6e

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