PDF malware analysis — malicious · 9a405081f95b86dc

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.8 KB

MD5: 381167808fd5a4b2c94ec402ee28995c SHA-1: 981c702f708f855d1d3d2e5dc299aafcd51b6ffc SHA-256: 9a405081f95b86dcb66c59ffc477df356d7fa0f937b74a782474d1b5f968fbbe

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, identified by the 'PDF_JAVASCRIPT' and 'PDF_JS' heuristics. The 'CVE_2007_5659' and 'PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER' heuristics indicate that the JavaScript is used as a stager to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of a large deobfuscated JavaScript file further supports this, suggesting complex obfuscation techniques were employed to hide the malicious intent. The ClamAV detection confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `cef46c295de37ce61d21b36750974484f08858137fb076530a008e1ea118c31b`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5032 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `f4e0b72313f827ba2eaf3dc74505f1468f6c5c285307975217fa7334f102f25b`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	75332 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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