Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9a2a866fb88d72d0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

21.3 KB Created: 2017-12-14 13:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-09-15
MD5: f0d57997fa57346cd149d15241588a36 SHA-1: 1be99f4ed909d28e6e9feae4a71f35f5115238dd SHA-256: 9a2a866fb88d72d025f7a4ced53bfcade0a97f6ceb4610c5e028f7c21e6ada4a
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is an OOXML document that leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows the document to load an external OLE object, which in this case is configured to download a second-stage payload from the URL 'https://github.com@2l.lv/26'. The embedded URL heuristic further confirms the presence of this external resource. The document body itself contains minimal content, indicating its primary purpose is to facilitate the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://github.com@2l.lv/26
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
c3d4c5dfe019e61c614b81733887bf8fd99cb8f2410d9a04904661c77c0a64e7		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 49184 bytes

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