Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99f9411f6a94306a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.8 KB Created: 2021-03-02 01:16:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: 4b6b3cdad5727a29b15f23a91bbe2ab7 SHA-1: d0e2b2e5e2fc0627c85e1b9a94ed8c1076b4b0ee SHA-256: 99f9411f6a94306a533b683984c0b01fff48fdae081ca3c619acdc845abdd684
326 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains an embedded script and multiple external links, indicating it is designed to lead the user to malicious content. The document body and heuristics suggest a lure to download and execute PowerShell, likely to download a second-stage payload. The presence of a link farm on disposable hosting and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kuzutuzo.ru/strik?utm_term=download+powershell+4.0+for+windows+7+32+bit PDF link annotation
    • http://sale20.site/what_are_primary_and_secondary_structures_in_geologyjdxli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://savatevadenu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452836/3b439140b53c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nexevakef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327015/2102263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://toxujubew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437446/lonefo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4369343/normal_5fc94a3b9be14.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://furimubabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856330/duxevin-xaxem-silovajidoxak-kowiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://itasda.online/mrs_dalloway_portugus_download_gratisawip3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tb-films.ru/cryptocurrency_trading_platforms_in_south_africasjt9g.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xukizawumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380236/ritisifuwasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bawidonawasaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134354070/dugode.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406463/normal_60357a8585d1b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383917/normal_5fd0efd79d969.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4457577/normal_5ffa9d2cd5cd8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4494430/normal_5fffe00556bc0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pabimoju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997489/negaba-sixame-timutojexoninen-tudibaritibujek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tejukikefuxod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134703803/b55b252dcf750f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://kemibibej.rf.gd/livro_ariel_sylvia_plath.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000131a0.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x131A0 1651 bytes
SHA-256: 180aa0eca5c282c5fcc9ea2fbc5515405a3bc6dec81a71de67dd872bf2a687fb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='LibreOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Rekuxo Baxupedu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Download powershell 4.0 for windows 7 32 bit. Windows 10 has been widely regarded as one of the best versions of Windows for quite some time. With</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Download powershell 4.0 for windows 7 32 bit. Windows 10 has been widely regarded as one of the best versions of Windows for quite some time. With</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Download powershell 4.0 for windows 7 32 bit</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-05-13T02:53:22'
  xmp:CreatorTool='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1c134cab-41ef-418a-84b7-f48a9f7b8cb4'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='df97c350-ae8d-41e9-8b46-f87e5e9613ab'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000f113.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF113 6000 bytes
SHA-256: 8f6b3245c2ebf320d76eb25266483dd8b4ea8c30961560240505c4ce72c66ced
font_01_sfnt_off0001059b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1059B 10564 bytes
SHA-256: 4cd5a4b1204e2f7c6a06938ec5343d0710a736ef3e5052472bba8c9a7996e600

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.