Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99f08f70f20a6e3e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

594.8 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: 43f6720b3f6c0e3be7a3932708e473ed SHA-1: ff4df1f42ceaf1c24f4c1de182d7fc2800901df9 SHA-256: 99f08f70f20a6e3eab34e80039cc781f3f7442591cb66fa2802fed3f5dc023f9
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000024fa.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x24FA 70702 bytes
SHA-256: 2b089051f3225dd77a02215b0e4e87d5325ec847e38fe267fe9d97caec41eb61