Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99ee5f2c21f9e7ce…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.0 KB
MD5: d6f73ecea561b5a3ec6bd6b7daeda7df SHA-1: 41370a651c4f59254b7cd6ebc17eaf0e4ef8a7c3 SHA-256: 99ee5f2c21f9e7ce553e8b62c05398f15161543d7ed13f4389410ef5aa227698
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is a PDF file that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms. This exploit allows for the execution of arbitrary code. The PDF contains embedded script payloads within XFA forms, indicating a malicious intent to leverage this vulnerability for code execution. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit is a common delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
89ca849b1145036d3765286509c54a90981636e36094dddb7631e5ba2361bde6		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101655 bytes

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