Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99d157ea01c64204…

MALICIOUS

PDF

148.3 KB Created: 2006-02-08 15:45:37 -05:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: ecf12ca86d366feaff02ba8c244cbda2 SHA-1: 6aa47a1cbff7de9124c9ccab56d9b7f558653cf1 SHA-256: 99d157ea01c6420495e2a119d1a0600a1e8cd1336190652701b1f8189a772442
514 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe. The primary payload is a Windows executable disguised as a PDF file, which is detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131. The exploit chain, identified as CVE-2010-1240, leverages the embedded executable to likely download and execute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\codigobuengobierno.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21665 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21665
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
codigobuengobierno.pdf
e6179847c24a3a9176785ccc0c3aef5ea3ebb2f13883cb25944aa8c0e33cc99f		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 129 at offset 0x1FEAF 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0130_000.js
a286fab649e2e217773943f12e15ed9cbde60ac30d46f4981d068c52a6cd6e6d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 130 at offset 0x24BC9 67 bytes
stream_038_off0001c8ca.bin
b3120e9fd2064bfd2bb523356a3f2eefc031fd3e3810135ff39ba87064a8d8ea		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1C8CA 11340 bytes
icc_00_off0000293a.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x293A 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0001ad29.bin
8fc53812d8c913ddf4a7908a931d9f55d87356c78fda5a6a2202a8ca320f4848		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1AD29 11040 bytes

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