Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99c71da511989487…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.3 KB Created: 2020-06-08 09:33:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fc899c2aec7124c8865b0104d652ce75 SHA-1: 1211d8efe56f5ff6e002dfdb360ff8782576601b SHA-256: 99c71da511989487e82b38933c720b87bd9fb232c1cead20da4f0042661f5671
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. These links point to various PDF files hosted on different domains, suggesting a link farm or distribution mechanism. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the primary function appears to be directing users to external resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://autodiscover.ladse.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604601/130604601.html#%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7+%25D9%2587%25D9%258A+%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2584%25D8%25BA%25D8%25A9+%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A+%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AD%25D8%25AF%25D8%25AB%25D9%2587%25D8%25A7+%25D9%2581%25D9%258A+%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B2%25D9%258A%25D9%2584
    • http://countrykidschildcare.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738876/8008327.pdf
    • http://redcrosskinsale.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543262/4505737.pdf
    • http://reflect.brolancon.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164034/watenevutexa.pdf
    • http://host55.tri-waymold.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130605097/3181347.pdf
    • http://euggle.store/uploads/1/3/0/3/130324340/d279fcebe.pdf
    • http://sweetmemoriesbydenisephotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969220/8518822.pdf
    • http://sandersprocessservice.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130291624/2192a5.pdf
    • http://mail.wakamoletacos.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302921/tajozuvimivuxutapa.pdf
    • http://goatsgaloreboergoats.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130379818/wekam-bitex-vusejer.pdf
    • http://mta-sts.ironcastlemarketing.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813654/1253784.pdf
    • http://webdisk.electrolarynx.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739836/8163549.pdf
    • http://dewiedits.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813524/6b4d9ce50d7e49.pdf
    • http://sallybstudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483210/pipukedopav_tojexosos_sovovawojaso.pdf
    • https://vakegikoj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/94376363057.pdf
    • https://boseduzazu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fogigizuva.pdf
    • https://tixuwujeseva.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/45172524760.pdf
    • https://nunobum.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/femasejaderuranezoruwojo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_003_off0000ac3e.bin
f180cc27ac84c4e70e36d1f754dba309e97198ce2c694a7481d9b79c4c551a9f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xAC3E 31112 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e2fe.bin
3def2b0e422afd7fa7af2b8e2fab8555a6273b9b0bfe2966ace21e6a9e862d8e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2FE 8856 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.