Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99a983ecb7492577…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

808.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-27
MD5: b7415783d7ed2b5a0d4d3ad2ffce13a9 SHA-1: 0ecd4b94f52f883702c7a9113b08f701c20b1f15 SHA-256: 99a983ecb7492577dd7ed4f5fba572c727f179644fe3686acbca833e3b61e6d0
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is rendered. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body was heavily corrupted, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
d126e992f1a8b6b501043ee6c59608cc3eb567501c60b812842bf9d654a81ae4
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0163D906/olE10nATIVe 1349 bytes