Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99a37b119f17a694…

MALICIOUS

RTF

93.0 KB First seen: 2024-07-12
MD5: 84bafe55d9087cdfce20ebdd74b8610f SHA-1: 738c8db7918e79aba33bbc51949a51651a8da74c SHA-256: 99a37b119f17a69497cd85b20466e078ffe63573266437bd62cbec91205465e2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to automatically activate this object upon opening. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically for downloading and executing further malicious content.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001acd.bin
e759159770ce5c52bd5c2176390810a0252814c235a74b53675bfc066f2a773f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1ACD 1647 bytes