Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 999d685a201f7541…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: 8bc2609721f0bbf93a7ea97da90bbc97 SHA-1: 8fcaf8fcf9dca40f86e13dc55ba835c0085790c9 SHA-256: 999d685a201f7541623da9759c3fc49bbeb3009e637cf3c0144f5b5c623cbafb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to exploitation. This pattern is commonly used to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000af.bin
42908fd79159a4409657eaedf203326fc4f458860b7a43fa7af22009ebc789ea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF 1994 bytes