Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9998ef5f4ea72ae5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.09 MB First seen: 2024-05-24
MD5: 7b044d66c7fcbc3d3bf6f5d52e96d3b2 SHA-1: f671b1d17948e20794bcd209d8ea1c32b1074155 SHA-256: 9998ef5f4ea72ae55f9f033b6aa7c21e5e3461ddd69e90a6525042ff6daab653
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The presence of excessive hex data within the objdata section suggests a hidden payload. The ".bin" file extracted from the objdata is likely the second-stage malware.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~4282KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000143f.bin
c6bcb2eef86cc98374d71383d34136b3d5683348eff17a0e1389613c2d633cdf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x143F 2141164 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.