Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9985f58f259ed1e6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

5.13 MB Created: 2025-09-16 18:10:00 First seen: 2026-02-16
MD5: a1f2f3c4c5b8b09a3df853e9e81f60de SHA-1: 51a9f84f29dabef0238ce169ddae4e0a0ceb909f SHA-256: 9985f58f259ed1e63261e65026cf62816a7c1dbbd69e699ce7af8db895636d53
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation), to execute embedded OLE objects. The presence of large hex-encoded data blocks and a PE header within the OLE objects strongly suggests the embedded content is a payload. The RTF_SVB_package indicates a potential secondary stage download or execution mechanism. The document body itself is a generic template, providing no specific lure, but the technical indicators point to a malicious exploit delivery.

Heuristics 11

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1913KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://csc3-2010-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://csc3-2010-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.cer0
    • https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
    • http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif04
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3-g5.crl04
    • https://www.globalsign.com/repository/0
    • http://ocsp.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g40C
    • http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gstsacasha384g4.crt0
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g4.crl0
    • http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr606
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r6.crl0G

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af73f.bin
c51b873bd7df890b521c774d15eb18e431132aadecd9f5e203bb5ed65df75e8b		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF73F 852970 bytes
objdata_01_off0025b66f.bin
d841fb09458f28707fa3b061de849cdb7c0817ab5e9759696e1890dc6eea4516		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x25B66F 584266 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
2352c9fffd0fd8eba341b4fd80ae0a94a85929bec042e2061b1f17cd52df50f2		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116884 bytes

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