Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 996cd10bf07c3c89…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

37.4 KB First seen: 2023-05-15
MD5: 99ad3bf224f658d7e304fe3d689cff89 SHA-1: 27b358780d490f545f9b41c95ecf4b87cfbe3db3 SHA-256: 996cd10bf07c3c898c52df087e10fb3400059110837b309bcb974cbe3b9c8411
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would likely trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object data is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000054d4.bin
3ff5911a9aa5e032ae3d705a2fb9df62c99618c19db019139c30c88aaaf53de9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x54D4 1512 bytes