Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9954c03ea22aac6f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: 4f492a1c222b24b95de10b05c16449fc SHA-1: a77f92245309b31664ec8d7362c6943f5379f716 SHA-256: 9954c03ea22aac6fe91b40a7a7daedf9ac3a1d9613238480c58313416c7e018f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics confirm this. The embedded object is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic indicates that the OLE object is forced to activate, triggering the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
f549f9ba7daa7fce6b88e9c5a3747de87133d619156193927a65996e6b7704ca
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27214 bytes
objdata_01_off0001cea9.bin
420dd98e97f2838b69fef2f6d85eff987f569ee4001ae1d6183f751f72b4b727
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CEA9 480330 bytes