Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9951d1c8d7d9a5c7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.56 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: e400be9b38030804b0187e2c5588da0d SHA-1: 3bfa341a1e90f4c9149cc3f282a95b9ff7346a91 SHA-256: 9951d1c8d7d9a5c7afeb7a9e3f73286d758901cc5d9976642b497a2b45ba68f2
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting CVE-2017-8759. This exploit is known to be used for delivering malicious payloads. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristics further confirms the exploitation of OLE object vulnerabilities within the RTF structure. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide direct clues to the user-facing lure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0026aae1.bin
3119391c0fcca61bdc4f30707df71c2ff72e87ce62a00e2ada434d67ff2bc6bb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x26AAE1 3732 bytes

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