Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 990f32ac5e94d0f0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

97.8 KB Created: 2023-05-24 00:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2023-05-31
MD5: e4c5b69a324c2b168fa852f5b304332d SHA-1: d075ee503743149e1c80d9a654c7f2bcfc536bd4 SHA-256: 990f32ac5e94d0f0ff10f6cb925c89946916ee032d48a7e8b010f7552a6f8194
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The OOXML document contains heuristics indicating remote template injection and external relationships, both pointing to the URL https://come.to/officedocs. This suggests the document is designed to fetch and execute malicious content from an external source. The presence of embedded OLE objects further supports a malicious intent, likely for delivering a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Remote template injection high OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE
    Document references a remote template URL (https://come.to/officedocs) — a common remote-template-injection vector used by Hancitor, Emotet and many phishing campaigns. Word can fetch and apply the remote template; macros in that template may execute depending on Office policy and trust state.
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: https://come.to/officedocs
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • https://come.to/officedocs

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
dac8f984e4e9dd647e36cb0f568bab0aa9187d55efe78bd82e2f007058c5507f
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet4.xlsm 11677 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
06569b42119b471f04070b4f9585a263d32198d995692e9fdded813a2a5bdf9c
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet1.xlsm 11689 bytes
emf_00.emf
1ab8f5abd845ffd0c61a61bb09bfcf20569b80b4496bccb58c623753cf40485c
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 4056 bytes