Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 99047a99575fc9da…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

357.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-23
MD5: 6429e553b947448863bb4ec2f2c35c90 SHA-1: 60e0a3b822ab44ed8808ce77b24003bb5e6b2aad SHA-256: 99047a99575fc9da72c419fb5c257c8dd653c5147cca334d6e46c1043f3e75cc
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a secondary document. The embedded VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is triggered by the OLE structure itself. The secondary embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings, indicating a multi-stage attack. The primary IOC is the URL used for the initial payload download.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.133.104.112/iil/ililililili%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23iilililii.doc
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
ffc12f2d1d56957f1f3a48efa8e198dcf2fe61deccd46a7cec70a4299f5c269f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 294400 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018200.pdf
5227cbc4d80996ad2fab699a2a65349392dc0fe37994392bcfd1509414a6a99d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18200 266752 bytes

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